This attitude is consistent with the way the speech is remembered: as a moderate, bipartisan statement of reconciliation. But it was also something else: a strategic decision by one of the most pragmatic, enigmatic and effective presidents who could handle the complexities of executive power in a segregated system. It is this hidden side of Jefferson that presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt sought to emulate. And it was this Jefferson – not the idealized, grassroots, individualistic advocate of small government – that his arch-enemy Hamilton aptly described as “wait-and-see” and calculating.

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I mention this because while traveling in Europe last month, I received several questions about Project 2025 from people who admittedly hadn’t read the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise (and who can blame them when it’s over 900 pages long?). Like many of us across the pond, they were curious about the document they’d heard so much about. They wondered what all the hype was about. Are the worries, fears, and panic attacks online and offline justified?

I prefer to avoid this question, if only because it is pointless, whatever the answer. Rather than adding to the hysteria and excitement (whether justified or not), I suggest looking at Project 2025 as a gift that, if taken seriously, studied, understood and used properly, presents an opportunity for Democrats.

By some estimates, this is the ninth time since 1981 that the Heritage Foundation and its affiliated groups have put their “vision” in writing. In doing so, they have laid their cards on the table for the world to see, and since this 30-chapter behemoth was compiled by “hundreds of contributors” with input from more than “400 academics and policy experts,” the tensions and contradictions you’d expect are all over the place. How could they not?

That’s why I started with Jefferson, and why so many others looked up to him. For all his weaknesses – and there were many – Jefferson was able to make Madison’s administration work in a way that even his close friend, the Father of the Constitution and our fourth President, could not.

Part of Jefferson’s clever approach, often confused with conciliation, was actually co-optation. Described by his Federalist opponents in the most vile terms that would today make even hard-hearted election observers blush, Jefferson did not come into office suddenly deciding he wanted to work with those who had accused him of all kinds of horrific crimes and immorality. Rather, he realized that in order to govern, he had to increase his majority by absorbing receptive members of the opposition faction (the moderates) and, by extension, isolating the remaining radicals.

Instead of being bipartisan, he was busy weakening the enemy through co-optation. James MacGregor Burns writes: “Jefferson had no interest in working with the Federalists. Rather, he hoped and expected that the Federalist Party would die. He pursued a much bolder strategy. He wanted to lure the moderate Federalists away from their conservative, ‘monarchical’ leader.”

To use this strategy, one must at least understand the divisions in the opponent’s coalition. And that is exactly what Project 2025 offers: a multitude of areas where there are divisions that can be exploited.

A typical example of this is the chapter on the Ministry of Foreign AffairsKiron K. Skinner takes readers on a journey around the world, which she, like her co-authors, believes is “on fire.” “Not every country or issue,” she warns, “can be debated” (interesting, considering the report is 920 pages long). Instead, she focuses on “examples of several areas where a change in U.S. foreign policy is not only important, but arguably existential.”

In a refreshing self-reflection—and a useful reminder to her opponents—she underscores the lack of agreement among conservatives on some of these issues. “The point,” she writes, “is not to suggest that everyone in the evolving conservative movement…will agree with the details of this assessment.” A point that becomes all too clear upon reading.

Among the “five countries on which the next administration should focus its attention and energy” is an issue that “deeply divides conservatives” – the “Russia-Ukraine conflict.”

The interventionists view Russian aggression and invasion of their neighbor as a major challenge to “US interests, as well as to peace, stability, and the post-Cold War security order.” They argue that the defeat of President Vladimir Putin and the return of all Ukrainian territories are imperative. Therefore, people on this side of the divide are pushing for US involvement in the region, continued support in the form of aid (military and economic), and, if necessary, the deployment of NATO and US troops.

On the other side are the isolationists, who do not see the war as a threat to US interests and argue that Europe, not the US, should help defend Ukraine. Moreover, they believe that the war should be ended quickly through negotiations so that the US can turn its attention to other areas (especially China).

There is also, she tells us, a third approach. And although she does not mention vice presidential candidate JD Vance in this context, this approach is closely linked to his concept of “client states.” Vance wrote After the Munich Security Conference, “America needs allies, not clients.” According to Vance, U.S. resources are limited, and so wealthy European nations should defend Ukraine so we can move on to other, more pressing matters. Skinner describes this “third way” as one in which “continued U.S. engagement must be fully funded; it must be limited to military assistance (while European allies take care of Ukraine’s economic needs); and there must be a clearly defined national security strategy that does not put American lives at risk.”

Skinner then adds something that is not entirely clear and seems to represent their best hope rather than reality: “Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland.” I am not sure if this is true during the Tucker Carlson’s recent meeting with Putin or Victor Orban’s Tête-à-Tête with Trump in Mar-a-Lago before the Republican National Convention.

Nevertheless, she concludes that all these conflicts, divisions and confusions among US conservatives in the context of the war between Ukraine and Russia offer a “generational opportunity to resolve the foreign policy tensions within the movement.”

I don’t know if that’s true, but it offers Democrats an opportunity to exploit a long-simmering issue on the right and thereby win over more moderate interventionists (and perhaps even some moderate isolationists for whom the idea of ​​client states is a stretch). A “Jefferson among us,” for example, might be smart enough to take the most compelling thing in the isolationists’ playbook and tweak it a little to gain just enough traction to co-opt them.

The disagreement over the war between Ukraine and Russia is not the only contradiction in the document. A close reading reveals other contradictions, including differing views on reproductive health and the issue of free versus fair trade.

As troubling as Project 2025 may be, all Americans should see it as an opportunity to find out what is dividing the opposition party. And politicians should use it to channel their inner Jefferson and weaken the opposition through co-optation.”

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