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Despite deadly attack, there is still hope for detente between Turkey and the PKK | PKK news
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Despite deadly attack, there is still hope for detente between Turkey and the PKK | PKK news

Istanbul, Türkiye – The sight of Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), walking through the Turkish parliament on October 1 and shaking hands with politicians from a pro-Kurdish party, DEM, was unlikely.

The MHP leader, a close ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been a vocal opponent of Kurdish demands for greater rights. He described Kurdish politicians as “terrorists” and accused them of links to the PKK, an armed group classified as a “terrorist organization” by Turkey and the West. He also called for a ban on the DEM predecessor.

The promise of new peace negotiations between Turkey and Kurdish fighters, who have waged a 40-year insurgency, were called into question last month after an attack on an aerospace factory near the capital Ankara.

Bahceli later said his gesture was a “message of national unity and brotherhood.”

Weeks later, he raised the possibility that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been serving a life sentence since 1999, could be released on parole if he renounced violence and disbanded his organization.

And then the next day, on October 23, an attack on the aerospace and defense company TUSAS, killing five people and killing the two attackers, threatened to undo the small steps that had been taken .

TUSAS produces civilian and military aircraft, including unmanned drones, which are crucial in the fight against the PKK, which has been waging a war against the Turkish state since the 1980s to demand greater autonomy for Kurds living in southeastern Turkey .

Two days later, the PKK claimed responsibility for the TUSAS attack. The statement said the raid had nothing to do with the recent “political agenda” but was planned long in advance as TUSAS weapons had “killed thousands of civilians, including children and women, in Kurdistan.”

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli attend a Republic Day event marking the 101st anniversary of the republic in Ankara, Turkey, on October 29, 2024. Murat Kula/Presidential Press Office/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. NO RESALE. NO ARCHIVES.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli attend a Republic Day event marking the 101st anniversary of the Republic in Ankara, Turkey, on October 29, 2024 (Murat Kula/ Presidential Press Office/Handout via Reuters)

“Historical time window”

And yet the attack may not be the death knell for a possible rapprochement, as some had initially feared. Instead, there appear to be elements of an underlying desire on both sides to work toward a solution to a protracted conflict that has killed tens of thousands of people.

DEM quickly made it clear that they rejected the TUSAS attack, condemning it and saying it was “significant” that it took place “when Turkish society is talking about a solution and the possibility of dialogue arises.”

Even after the attack, Erdogan himself described the developments as an “unprecedented opportunity”.

In a speech on October 30, the president praised Bahceli’s “willingness to concentrate on the right path” and said: “Anyone who reads the MHP chairman’s calls in this context recognizes the historic window of opportunity.”

The DEM is now reportedly trying to create a formal structure for peace negotiations involving senior figures from all political parties.

Ibrahim Akin, a lawmaker from the DEM party, described Bahceli’s comments about Öcalan as a “sign of a new era” and an indication of the government’s approach.

“However, there are still many things that are uncertain and cause for concern,” he said. “We want a transparent process to be carried out in which all parties and all political actors are included.”

FILE PHOTO: Supporters of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) display flags with a portrait of imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan Istanbul during a rally to celebrate Nowruz, the beginning of spring , Turkey, March 17, 2024. REUTERS/Umit Bektas/File Photo
Supporters of the pro-Kurdish DEM party display flags with a portrait of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan during a rally to celebrate Newroz, the beginning of spring, in Istanbul, Turkey, March 17, 2024 (Umit Bektas/Reuters)

Justification

After the attack in Ankara, Turkey launched a wave of airstrikes against the PKK in Iraq and Syria.

Since the late 1990s, the group has controlled its operations in Turkey from the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq. The Turkish military has significantly restricted the PKK’s activities in Turkey in recent years by establishing dozens of bases on the Iraqi side of the border and carrying out cross-border airstrikes.

Meanwhile, in northeast Syria, Turkey has also targeted the PKK-allied People’s Protection Units (YPG), which the US has been supporting with weapons and training since 2015 in the fight against ISIL (ISIS). American support for the Kurdish armed group strained Türkiye’s relations with the United States.

While Turkey does not recognize a separation between the PKK and YPG, most Western states reject the latter’s designation as a “terrorist” group. After the TUSAS attack, Erdogan said the two PKK attackers entered Turkey from Syria, implicating the YPG.

Some commentators see the reason for the recent talks as Erdogan’s desire to change Turkey’s current constitution, which would not allow him to run for office again unless early elections are called.

The DEM – the third largest party in parliament – ​​could provide valuable support.

“The ruling coalition will likely try to amend the constitution to remove Erdogan’s deadlines,” said Berk Esen, a political scientist at Sabanci University in Istanbul. “They probably want to split the opposition coalition and co-opt, if not directly the Kurdish political movement, then at least some Kurdish voters, particularly conservative Kurdish voters in southeastern Anatolia.”

The idea of ​​a deal between the Turkish government under Erdogan and the PKK is not as far-fetched as it might initially seem. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) made major efforts in its first years in power in the 2000s to give more rights to Turkey’s Kurds, who had long been a marginalized group. A peace process launched in 2013 appeared at times close to success before failing in 2015.

The current move also comes at a time of extreme unrest in the Middle East. U.S. support for Israel has reportedly unsettled Kurdish groups, including the PKK, which has historical ties to Palestinian armed groups. DEM is extremely critical of Israeli actions in Gaza and Lebanon.

A second Donald Trump presidency would also likely result in the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, removing protection from the YPG.

Esen said Turkey may be taking a “pre-emptive step to fill the political vacuum created in the Middle East” in order to “move forward in the region.”

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, director of the Ankara-based German Marshall Fund, said: “Favorable conditions, including regional actors preoccupied with other crises, and the PKK’s weakened state suggest an opportunity for progress.”

However, he questioned whether Öcalan, who has been held incommunicado for the past few years, still has enough influence over the PKK to control the process.

“Furthermore, there are limits to what the Turkish public can tolerate when talking to the PKK, and allowing Öcalan to speak in the Turkish parliament remains outside of these limits,” Unluhisarcikli added.

A poll conducted on October 24 by the Institute of Social Studies found that almost three-quarters of respondents opposed Öcalan’s release. In a less scientific measure of public reaction, soccer fans at a Fenerbahce game in Istanbul chanted insults about the PKK leader after the Ankara attack.

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